This chapter examines the case of 'Africa's World War' in historical and regional perspective, identifying the different conflicting visions of order that coexist in the region, and giving the necessary background to the international peacebuilding strategies.
The sources of conflict and the role of resistance
The complexities developed during two decades of war and peacebuilding in the DRC mean that state and non-state actors alike are engaged in processes of authority assertion, war and accumulation. The few accounts on resistance provide detailed and historically grounded analyses but have not theorised resistance itself. Rather, they have captured the responses of Congolese people to the imposition of war conditions and domination from different perspectives: the informal arena as a source of alternative economic and political arrangements . These analyses provide a sense of the historical and present political activity of Congolese nonelites, illustrating that people's responses to deteriorating living conditions can be seen as patterns of actions that attempt to transform or evade the social order.
The absence of a theorisation of resistance from the peacebuilding context of the DRC does not stem from the lack of resistance but, rather, from the accounts that have been given of the conflict itself. Three of these accounts stand out. On the one hand, focusing on the motivations for war, is the resource wars thesis. On the other hand are two approaches that focus on the actors involved: localist and regionalist. With the spectre of the failed state underpinning all of them and the absence of a broad political movement, these analyses examine the actions of subordinate groups, both as victims and as co-producers of a context of domination, plunder and violence, thereby undermining important political implications.
(p.78) The resource wars thesis
The resource wars thesis has driven mainstream academic, policy and activist research. Though disputed, the DRC has been one of the paradigmatic cases used to argue that the access and commercialisation of natural resources fuels and protracts conflict. 1 UN strategy in the DRC has, until now, followed this thesis. A series of high-level reports have consistently linked resource exploitation and the continuation of wars (UN Group of Experts 2015b). 2 The thesis has applied to the first period of inter-state war, as its cause, and to the continuation of conflict in Eastern DRC. Although this thesis undermines the political motivations for war, it rightly identifies exploitation and accumulation as important dynamics for conflict. and several Mai Mai groups have continued to operate, thanks to resource trafficking and their occupation of mines.
Despite the wide embracement of this thesis, implementation of policy has been slow and inconsistent, especially when applying sanctions and prohibitions on neighbouring countries and large corporations. The Kimberley Process, although a significant step towards eliminating illegal trade of diamonds, has been dubbed 'toothless' and is said to continue to exist 'in name only' (Elving 2012 The resource wars thesis has informed UN policy towards statebuilding, reflecting not only the vision of the DRC as failed but also the influence of neoliberal understandings of how states and their economies should work. Neoliberal approaches to statebuilding have called for contradictory approaches. They have pursued a policy of rebuilding the state while deregulating its industries, delinking forms of economic control from the central apparatus of the state and fostering market self-regulation. For example, mining management has been carried out through several attempts to formalise private control (p.79) (Kuditshini 2008 ). 3 The reliance on private actors means that, despite the shaming and finger-pointing contained in these reports, some sensitive material was removed from the final report and few judicial procedures have been . While establishing mechanisms for the tracing of resources, they have also pushed many investors out of the DRC, impacting on thousands who depend on mining for a living (Cuvelier, Van Bockstael et al. 2014 ). The impact on conflict has been limited as armed groups have other sources of funding such as taxation, robbery, support from the civilian population and contributions from the diaspora. 5 While the resource wars thesis unearths important dynamics of conflict in the DRC, it portrays practices of accumulation as a criminal rather than a political undertaking. has existed in parallel with cash-crops ever since as a marginal low-income activity, increasingly dependent on farmers being able to rent rather than own land. This is a feature not just of the way the Belgian colonial administration dealt with the distribution of wealth and rights, but also of the particular value of exchanges in the global market. Lastly, the separation of the local from the national and regional is an artificial device that resembles the resource war thesis from the bottom up. The politics of villagers in the localist version seem to be confined to the access of land and political power. From this view, the history of revolt for social change and the constraints imposed by the global economy are out of the picture. Yet land and power are inextricably linked to the global market and to notions of social justice.
Localists ultimately portray the image of a violent inside that disrupts a more pacified outside, remaining within a framework in which the right kind of interveners with the right kind of sensitivity could apply policies that would build the right kind of state. But, as seen in previous chapters, and as will be observed in later ones, any state is the outcome of the entanglement between the global and the local. This is visible once again in the present peacebuilding process. At the local level, it is possible to find actors as disparate as the UN, the military, a corporation or an externally backed armed group playing state-like roles in the absence of an administrative state-based authority. These actors contribute either directly or indirectly to practices of coercion and extraction, and only very limitedly to the realisation of the liberal state of peacebuilding policies. Armed militias may be linked to particular ethnic groups, but this does not reduce the conflict to land or to an ethnic conflict. The fluidity of other identities, the diversity of power relations, the history of the struggle for better conditions of living and the dynamics of the global economy impinge on the local context and are necessary elements for understanding the conflict.
Regionalists
It is this greater set of elements that regionalists capture. Most regionalists do not disregard the local features intervening in the continuation of conflict. What they argue is that the dynamics in the DRC are linked to the dynamics of the Great Lakes region. In this view, it is not just state actors like Rwanda and Uganda who have affected the development of events, but also their interconnections with their corresponding diasporas in each country, their common and A vivid example of the differences between regionalists and localists has been exposed by Jason Stearns's criticism of an article published by Séverine (p.84) Autesserre in the New York Times. The journal piece summarises the arguments Autesserre has made over the last 10 years:
The international community has failed to help Congo achieve peace and security because it fundamentally misunderstands the causes of the violence [-] distinctively local conflicts over land, grassroots power, status and resources, like cattle, charcoal, timber, drugs and fees levied at checkpoints. Most of the violence in Congo is not coordinated on a large scale. It is the product of conflicts among fragmented local militias, each trying to advance its own agenda at the village or district level. Those then percolate and expand. An exploration of resistance precisely takes this complexity into account, considering the different levels on which actors operate and seeing local and global, present and history as coconstituted. The analyses explored above also underline that a lack of more organised movements is seen as an absence of resistance; instead, state failure, ethnic alliances, patronage and self-seeking individuals are seen as the main causes of conflict. Yet, neither patronage nor the figure of the failed state illustrates how political authority is exercised. Ethnicity is just one element among many identities and factors that impact on conflict. Additionally, as will be shown in the next chapters, these factors impact on resistance but they do not define it.
Landmarks of a multi-layered conflict
In spite of the complex dynamics of conflict and the long history of structural and physical violence in the DRC, it is helpful to retain a basic chronology of the actual conflict. This can be divided into three phases. First, a period of large-scale war from 1996 until 2003; second, a period of transition between 2003 and 2006, ending with the first democratic elections since independence; and third, a decade of cyclical conflict localised mainly in the eastern part of the territory. Every time conflict has erupted during this last decade there has been a similar response: a process of negotiation, mainly based on reintegration and disarmament -but not followed by either party -and a military response generally involving the FARDC, the UN and the Rwandan army. DRC-Rwandan relations have also marked this last period as they have engaged in mutual instrumentalisations and confrontations through proxy wars, which have carried the mark of both countries' statebuilding projects. Although Jason Stearns and Christopher Vogel argue that since the M-23 defeat and later changes in the FARDC Rwanda has lost most of its military allies and there has been a decline in the regional dimension of the conflict, these dynamics are likely to continue (2015: 5).
Multi-state war and revolt in the first large confrontations (1996-2003)
The immediate context of war, resistance, state-making and peacebuilding in the DRC has been marked by four events: the ousting of Mobutu, which suffocated an important democratic movement; the Rwandan genocide; the AFDL (l'Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo) war of 1996-97; and the RCD rebellion, which turned into 'Africa's First World War ' (1998-2003) . These four events have created a militarised extractive context of (p. 86) plural authorities, which explains why resistance generally takes both a covert and a militarised form. second, in which the Tutsi-led AFDL along with the APR (Armée Patriotique Rwandaise) killed 300,000 Hutu refugees, militias and civilians during the 1996-97 military campaign in the DRC (Young 2002: 13-14). As such, its effects were regional, not only as an ignition factor for the Congo Wars, but also as an impact on how politics and war in the Great Lakes region began to be determined by a pro-anti-Kagame--Tutsi division (Prunier 2009: xxxi; Stearns 2011: 8) . Since then, the genocide has marked Rwanda's need for security in Eastern DRC, in addition to its economic agendas. For Rwanda, the fulfilment of these security and economic agendas largely depends on intervening in the DRC. Yet the two wars that Rwanda has led in the DRC have both bolstered and endangered Rwanda's interests.
The third and fourth events were the two complex, multi-state wars of 1996 (AFDL/APR war) and 1998 (RCD War) or war of liberation and war of aggression, as Ndaywel è Nziem prefers to call them (2011: 268-72). The full-blown militarisation that these two conflicts provoked was due not just to the circumstances of inter-state war, but also to the fact that civilians were extensively targeted and engaged in the war effort. The AFDL campaign was aimed at: (1) dismantling the refugee camps where Interahamwe genocidaires from Rwanda were living, to prevent them reorganising; and (2) ousting Mobutu, who had become a source of insecurity in the region. 9 The campaign had US support, but also crucial to its success were the interventions of Angola and France and the mobilisation of Mai Mai militias and factions of the Congolese military.
(p.87) The RCD war began as a US-backed Rwandan-Ugandan-Burundian effort to oust Laurent Desirée Kabila, allied to an internal movement called the Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD). It then encountered the response of the Angolan, Namibian, Chad, Zimbabwean armies and Mai Mai militias. These militias sided with Laurent Desirée Kabila because they had a historical and ideological connection with him as a revolutionary figure. 90) instrumentalisation between the DRC and Rwanda, which has fuelled the creation and maintenance of armed groups fighting proxy wars for economic, political and security gains. The second and third dynamics go together as they form the pattern of responses addressing the conflicts. One is the repeated shallow and uncommitted negotiations; the other is a reliance on military means. The post-transition period, which needed to consolidate state authority and peace, has, rather, pluralised state authority, and in the eastern provinces has seen an increasingly militarised environment. In order to better understand this complex decade, this section examines the three dynamics separately.
DRC-Rwanda instrumentalisations and confrontations
One source of the sour relations between Rwanda and the DRC has been the FDLR. Ever since the AFDL war in 1996 Rwanda has claimed that a weak DRC is a threat to its security, providing refuge to dissident FDLR-Interahamwe Global Witness 2010a). For the populations of South Kivu and Shabunda in particular, the fact that a self-defence group (Raïa Mutomboki) has been able to expel the FDLR is evidence that neither the DRC, nor Rwanda, nor the diplomatic community present in the DRC has a real commitment to stopping it.
In its 20 years in the DRC, the FDLR has not only consolidated its standing as a destabilising factor, accused of committing atrocities against the civilian population, but has also consolidated its standing as an exchange currency in the DRC-Rwanda relations. The DRC has used it to confront and maintain leverage against Rwanda. Observers note that the problem of the FDLR may be overstated, facilitating a justification for intervening politically and militarily in the DRC in pursuit of other agendas ( Up to 650,000 people were displaced, war crimes were reported and Kabila called on the population to attend to the 'obligation to resist the imposition of war [and] for everyone to participate in the defence of the national sovereignty'. 17 Several armed groups were formed as a popular response to this uprising. Some of these were attached to the DRC and neighbouring governments, others were part of the ongoing popular response to the constant instability of the preceding decade. The official responses from the DRC Government and the UN, aiming for the reintegration of troops, have been claimed to be 'dead-ends' precisely because the old reintegration strategies have
The DRC response to these two uprisings has been contradictory. On the one hand, encouraged by the UN and the diplomatic community, there have been a series of programmes to integrate Nkunda's troops in the FARDC. On the other hand, the DRC Government has supported the FDLR and Mai Mai groups, especially PARECO and the Alliance des Patriotes pour un Congo Libre et Souverain against Nkunda and Ntaganda, respectively, in an attempt to confront Rwanda's hegemony (UN Group of Experts 2008b: para. 18). As discussed below, this enters into the logic of giving primacy to military means and the assertion of state authority over political negotiations.
Negotiations without commitment 18
The second dynamic characterising the 2006-16 decade is flawed political agreements. was a compromise, encouraged by the diplomatic community, to reinforce state presence in the area.
As already seen in Chapter 1, it was not just the military positions CNDP members were granted; they were also granted oversight over refugees returning to the region. Interestingly, residents are not the only ones to have this perception. According to a UNHCR officer, Rwanda is using this strategy to such effect:
The people that want to come into Walikale and Lubero are not Congolese; it is Kigali that dictates that. There is not a lot of population there, so those who live there feel really threatened. There is a lot of space. The strategy is that they allow for those new settlers to come in and compensate them with development projects. We need to do that very slowly. People in Walikale are the people from the hills, with provincial characters, we need to convince them. We need to reduce the dependence of people on the customary chief. We need to give a land title to each of them and create the conditions so that investors can come to bring development. But for that we need to train the customary chief and give him an alternative also. It is a political but also a humanitarian project. It is the only way, otherwise we risk that there is war again. We can put pressure on Rwanda in regards to the FDLR but their policy of establishing themselves in Congo is not possible, they receive 50 per cent of their budget from overseas, but if the West stops their aid, they can always go to China. Rwanda has a de facto occupation of Rutshuru and Masisi, and it is now trying to take Walikale and Lubero because there are a lot of minerals there, we can only try that this is done in a calm and peaceful way.
(UNHCR Officer 2010)
Shared authority is fundamental to the practice of deploying state authority. Yet it externalises violent consequences onto the population. The M-23 uprising was a wake-up call to many that a serious peace agreement was needed for the political issues underlying the conflict to be addressed. The failed state thesis and the turn to the local sources of conflict have continued a trend in which Congolese endogenous factors of conflict are the ultimate target of policies. In party: the DRC to undertake security sector reform, to consolidate state authority, reforms, development and democratisation; the countries of the region to stop meddling in each other's affairs and stop supporting armed groups; the donors to renew their commitment. This agreement triggered several developments. Significant international pressure from donors was applied on Rwanda to stop financing armed groups in the DRC. Ntaganda surrendered at the US embassy in March 2013 and is currently being tried by the International Criminal Court (p.95) (ICC 2015) . This was a step forward in comparison to the case of Nkunda, who, despite the indictment the DRC has against him, has lived under house arrest in Rwanda since January 2009. However, there has been limited progress on several fronts. Armed groups continue to operate, an increasing number of ex-M-23 members have been granted amnesty and the democratisation process is currently threatened by an uncertain third round of elections.
A common feature of these agreements, from the Goma Accords to the PSCF, is their reliance on military means. Looked at from the perspective of the challenges the political path has faced, it seems that military means have gathered greater commitment. Yet military operations have created greater insecurity, and armed groups have not been neutralised (Human Rights Watch 2015; UNSG 2015). Agreements have achieved greater militarisation while fuelling conflict.
Peace through military means
The third and final dynamic of the decade after the 2006 elections has been the reliance on military means. For rural populations, military operations and the continuation of armed groups have added to the perception that self-defence militias are the only recourse to achieve security. The continued existence of these militias has justified the need to increase military intervention. Further, political compromises through the negotiations seen above and the lack of means to deploy state administrators have also entailed the deployment of the military (at times ex-armed groups) as a representation of authority. This has increased the reliance on self-defence militias for the purpose of protection both against the military and against other armed groups.
The 2008 Goma Conference formalised a rapprochement between the DRC and Rwanda, encouraging a series of formal military operations against the FDLR backed by MONUC, and giving the operations special powers, funding and immunities. The fact that a military operation was prioritised illustrates a strengthening of statebuilding, but through sharing means of coercion and extraction and informalised governance formulas based on scattering the army across the territory of North and South Kivu.
Between January 2009 and April 2012 three military operations were launched: Umoja Wetu, Kimya II and Amani Leo (Radio Okapi 2012a) ( Table 3 .1). These operations provoked an outcry. Although they managed to dismantle certain FDLR chains of command and camps, as well as dislodging them from the mine sites they had occupied, they did so with a big toll on civilians popular rejection of these operations led the Government to introduce operation Amani Leo. In the eyes of a commander deployed in South Kivu, the problem with the previous operations was that the population was not involved or consulted (FARDC Colonel (no. 129) 2010).
Nevertheless, with or without popular support, these operations represented one of the backbones of the restoration of state authority. An Amani Leo FARDC operations officer defined the strategy as follows:
It is not about exterminating all FDLR like saying -there is no one FDLR member that breathes -no, that is not possible; what we mean is that in one or two months we can eradicate the FDLR phenomenon, as a military organisation here in our country, with all its capacity to operate, to set up barriers on the roads and get taxes, to continue exploiting the minerals like they want, to have the political control of certain localities. Once eradicated, we can restore state authority all across the country. The conclusion that is derived from the over 20 years of conflict is that a truly engaged political process has yet to be seen. Without it, conflict keeps erupting and military means are prevalent. After the last major crisis, different national, regional and international actors seem to have renewed their commitment to more serious solutions, tackling the conflict on several levels. Yet the everyday life of the rural classes has not changed substantially. The proxy wars between the DRC and Rwanda, their mutual instrumentalisation, the reliance on the military to assert state authority in a political context that has an important democratic and development deficit have only entrenched the conflict. Peacebuilding strategies, however, have not been external to these processes.
The UN and the contradictions of peacebuilding
The UN's peacebuilding strategies in the DRC are more reflective of the evolution of frameworks for conflict resolution than of the actual evolution of the conflict. Although the UN declared the DRC a threat to international peace and security in order to justify its intervention, a late and controversial arms embargo and a lack of response to a war of aggression against a member state were evidence that the image of Zaire/DRC as a failed state had become the guidance for action (UN Security Council 1996; 1999; Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) appeals for humanitarian assistance (Table 3. 2).
The disparities between needs, goals and actual funding reflect the political nature of aid.
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What is relevant is that the agenda of social and political transformation stemming from the definition of the DRC state as non-existent, where statebuilders start 'from scratch', is contradictory to some donor agendas (MONUC Political Affairs Officer (no. The aim of reconstructing state authority has seen the UN and donors entering the same logic of informal politics that they were trying to tackle. Ever since its first deployment, MONUC has prioritised strategies which are conducive to the formation of government and the restructuring of the security sector. This has relied on power-sharing agreements between the warring parties, which has not only given an incentive to take up arms but also created a contradiction to the aims of fostering peace and promoting democracy ( . This is not just a matter of asserting trade-offs in a difficult political process, but one of articulating the contradictory relationship that state-making has with peace. The UN has been instrumental in providing legitimacy and, to some extent, logistics to articulate patchy formulas of informal and shared authority with neighbouring states and through the military. The result has been the creation of new sources of violence. From different positions, Verhogen, Vlassenroot and Raeymaekers illustrate how peacebuilding has relied on forms of privatised governance, which have been constitutive of structural violence dynamics, ultimately producing and reproducing sources of insecurity (Verhoeven 2009: 406; Vlassenroot and Raeymaekers 2009: 484). For Trefon this is due to peacebuilding in the DRC being a strategy of 'mismanagement, hypocrisy, powerlessness and sabotage' (2011: ix). Reform and aid strategies, both intentionally and unintentionally, either fail or reproduce the problems they were trying to solve (Trefon 2011: 9) . This is facilitated by a culture of secrecy and impunity and a climate of mutual instrumentalisation and competition between national and international actors (Trefon 2011: 14-18).
State-making and peacebuilding as seen in the actions of MONUC/MONUSCO are contradictory: there is a disconnect between aims and funding and the conflicting agendas of member states. This has been further challenged by the fact that processes and certain policies for building state authority have themselves been contradictory to other priorities such as civilian protection and peacebuilding. The fact that the main sources of legitimate authority for (p.103) intervention rely on these priorities, yet are also its main shortcomings, points to deeper incoherencies in the nature of the processes.
Militarisation, plural authority and extraction: the context of resistance Africa's World War could be seen as a series of violent conflicts that started with a coup against Mobutu orchestrated by a multi-state coalition and joined by a popular revolt. What followed was an even greater multi-state war which has continued, after a violent peace transition, with a series of cyclical conflicts until today. These latter conflicts are the result of the continuous desire by popular classes for change; of changes and continuities in the security, political and economic interests of different countries in the region and their allies; and of the specific local dynamics around land, resources, political participation and commercial networks that were in place before the war but which have been exacerbated and crystallised through the war. During these periods, war and state-making have been determinants for the militarisation of the environment. This explains that the nature of resistance has been violent as well as covert. The plurality of new authorities, elites and alliances that has been forged across ideological and ethnic lines has fragmented both rule and resistance. The context has been marked by the use of violence in the pursuit of state security and economic agendas, even if through proxy armed groups. Resistance, as we will see, is not an anti-state or an anti-war movement but, rather, a negation, or at least a mitigation, of the everyday context of domination. Analyses of the sources of conflict tend to see the conflict as stemming from the particular dynamics of the DRC. This not only detaches the DRC from its history, it evades the interconnection of global political and economic dynamics. These are particularly important in understanding the conflict in its full political scope.
Throughout the whole period, multiple actors, including the UN, have fostered governance arrangements that have not always led to the creation of state authority or provided civilian protection. Although the UN has at times played a secondary role to donor countries' agendas, an examination of its policies illustrates that having statebuilding as a primary peacebuilding strategy has not only missed important dynamics of conflict but has also fostered violence inherent in the state-making process. An increasing reliance on military means, despite political agreements, has undermined these agreements, fuelled militarised resistance and exacerbated the dynamics of authoritarian militarised state power that is at the root of many current problems. An important implication of these multiple periods of conflict is that alongside multiple wars there are multiple statebuilding agendas. These have been mutually reinforcing, but also mutually undermining. In the DRC, war does not necessarily make the state, nor is the state the only actor in war; war has been seen as a useful and effective tool to pursue certain state agendas. Rather than centralising state (p.104) power and military power, wars have acted primarily against the population. They have left, at times, a scattered presence of military authority and have forced state and non-state actors to form contingent alliances. Although this is part of a continuing process, the dynamic of fostering informal governance arrangements has generated a cohabited context of citizens and military, exposing the inextricable relationships between war, state-making and resistance. (12) The DRC has one of the largest numbers of IDPs and refugees in the world (UNHCRDemocratic Republic of the Congo 2012a).
(13) Kabila was shot by Rachidi Kasereka, one of his bodyguards. However, the real hand behind this murder is still discussed, not least because Kabila had created many enemies. Some strong theses point to the murder being attributable to Angola, some others point to more direct involvement of the US, inaugurating a period of more intense Western intervention. 
